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NOTES
in articles 8 and 9 of this chapter and the plaintiff therein suffer
a non-suit etc." R. S. Mo. 1929, §869 is one of the sections in
Article 9 referred to R. S. Mo. 1929, §874. Thus, since the orig-
inal action was not brought within the time allowed therefor in
article 9, §874, had nothing to apply to, and hence any remarks
concerning its effects are purely dicta.
There being no other deviations from the rule as declared by
the Missouri Supreme Court in Handlin v. Burchett it stands as
the law of Missouri today, the rule being that whenever, under
the law of the place where the cause of action arose, further
action thereon is barred, the same bar is a complete defense to
any action thereon in the courts of Missouri.
J. H. HALEY '26.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS WITH RECENT MISSOURI
DEVELOPMENTS
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted into law
in Missouri on June 22, 1935,1 thus becoming the sixth Uniform
Act to be adopted in Missouri: the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the Warehouse Receipts Act, the Reciprocal Transfer Act, the
Veterans Guardianship Act, and the Federal Tax Lien Registra-
tion Act having been adopted previously. Four of the six acts
have been adopted within the last six years. The widespread
interest which has been manifested in the Declaratory Judgment
Act by legal scholars and by state legislatures merits its dis-
cussion.
Historically, the underlying theory of declaratory actions dates
back to the time of Moses.2 From the Bible we learn that
Zelophehad, a noble Israelite, died and left five daughters. In-
dignant over the possibility of having the property pass from the
family's control because the father left no male heir to succeed
to the heirloom, the daughters insisted upon claiming the right
to inherit the estate. The petition was pointed! It simply put
to the court the question, "Why should the name of our father
be done away from among his family, because he hath no son?"
'Laws of Mo. 1935 p. 218. The wording of section 1 of the Missouri law
has substituted the wording, "The Circuit Courts and the Courts of Com-
mon Pleas of this state, within their respective jurisdictions, etc." for the
phrase, "Courts of record within, etc." contained in the Uniform Act. Sec-
tions 16 & 17 were omitted as being unnecessary and Section 15 was ra-
worded to read, "All laws or parts of law in conflict with the provisions
of this act are hereby repealed in so far as such laws are in conflict with
provisions of this tet."
2 Clark, And Zelophehad Had Daughters, 10 A. B. A. Journal 133 (1924).
3 Numbers, 27: 4.
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The prayer was granted and the law changed for all times.
Moses sitting as chief justice declared:
"And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying,
if a man die, and have no son, then ye shall cause his in-
heritance to pass unto his daughters . . . and it shall be
unto the children of Israel a statute of judgment."'4
Since the judgment declared in the children a future interest
in the Promised Land, it was purely declaratory in nature. When
it came to the apportionment of the territory in the Promised
Land, the petitioner's judgment was upheld; it was res fudicatt.5
The next example of a declaratory decree, in point of time, is
that evidenced in the Roman Law. Under Roman procedure the
condemnatio is analogous to our executory judgment. Where
parties wanted, however, a preliminary decision they would refer
their matter at issue to the judex, and his decision, which was
no more than a declaration, was called a prae-judicium, con-
taining no condem-atio. Another method illustrative of declara-
tory action was in the procedure adopted by the magistrates,
who upon coming into office would cause to be published an edict,
called a perpetuum, consisting chiefly of statements by the praetor
of what he would do in certain instances. The essence of this
procedure was the declaration of a remedy. All these pre-re-
quired decisions were given the force and effect of law, and the
procedure became so useful in their jurisprudence that it was
juxtaposed with the ius civite, arising from statute and inter-
pretation. It became interwoven in the Roman law much like
equity with the common law in the English legal system.
Through the Middle Ages some forms of declaratory actions
existed in most of the states of Central Europe. The present type
of declaratory judgment acts seems to be patterned after the
act adopted in Scotland some 400 years ago. The Scotch act was
the vanguard in the development and even today stands fore-
most in the field of declaratory legislation."'
Of the major commercial nations today England is the most
enterprising in the field. In 1852 an act amending the rules of
practice for the Chancery Court was adopted.7 One of the newly
enacted sections provided that no suit in the Chancellor's Court
4 Numbers, 27: 7, 8, 11.
5 Joshua, 17: 3, 4.6 Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman= Law, pp. 95-97; Borchard,
The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 Yale L. J. 1.
7 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, sec. 50.8 (1856) 2 K. & J. 753. The decision limited the application to cases in
which some equitable relif might have been granted had the plaintiff de-
sired to ask for it.
81 Infra, note 117.
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should be open to objection merely because a declaratory order
was asked, and that it should be lawful for the court to make a
binding declaration of rights without granting consequential re-
lief. The useful application of this act was prevented because of
its strict construction in Rooke v. Lord Kensington." This judi-
cially imposed limitation prompted Parliament to pass an act
which would dispose of these restrictions. With the passage of
the Judicature Act of 1873 a complete innovation was effected.
The pertinent section provided:9
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the
ground that a mere declaratory judgment is sought thereby,
and the court may make binding declaration of rights
whether any consequential relief is sought or could be
claimed or not."
From the enactment of this act until the present day England
has made wide use of the declaratory decrees. Its utility has
there never been judicially questioned. It was accepted as a
useful procedural reform. Experience has proved its worth. It
has been weighed in the scales of English justice, and found
not wanting.
In the United States the first attempt to obtain what some
commentators think would today be properly a declaratory judg-
ment, was made by the Secretary of State in 1793, when Jefferson
inquired of the Supreme Court justices whether their advise
would be available to the executive in the interpretation of
statutes, treaties, etc. It was advanced that the problems pre-
sented were often not cognizable by the tribunals of the country.
The answer of the court to President Washington was to the
effect that the separation of the three departments of govern-
ment furnished cogent argument against the practice of extra-
judicially deciding the questions alluded to. The President was
advised to depend upon the recommendations of the heads of
the departments.10
The first state to pass a declaratory judgment act in the United
States was Rhode Island which in 1876 passed an act permitting
a very limited use of the declaratory judgment. The first more
inclusive act was passed in 1915 by the state of New Jersey. 1
This act was followed four years later by the Michigan statute 2
which in substance was very similar to the act which in 1921
was given the approval of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. The adoption of the act by
'Rule 5, order 25. This provision although adopted in 1873 did not go
into effect until 1883.
10 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, vol. 3, p. 486.
11 New Jersey Laws 1915, p. 184.12 Public Acts 1919 (Mich.) act 150.
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this body, furnished the momentum which has resulted in the
acceptance of the Uniform Act in twenty-four states.13 Thirteen
other jurisdictions now have such statutes permitting declara-
tory actions differing in some small respect from the Uniform
Act.1 4 Three states have adopted the act this year.18
A movement to have a federal act passed permitting declara-
tory judgments in the federal courts was officially inaugurated
on Jan. 7, 1919, 6 when such a bill was introduced in the United
States Senate. Since that time at least one such bill was intro-
duced at each session of Congress until the 73rd Congress finally
passed the measure and it was sent to the President for his
approval. On June 14, 1934, President Roosevelt penned his ap-
proval and the act became law.1" During the fifteen year period
the House of Representatives had acted favorably on three of
the bills but each time the bills were left to perish in the Senate
Judiciary Committee. The Federal Act is an abbreviated form
of the Uniform Act but contains all the pertinent provisions.'8
is Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Ver-
mont, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Puerto Rico.
14 California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Philippines, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virgina.15 Montana, Alabama, and Missouri all adopted the act within the first
ten months of 1935.
18 65th Congress, S. 5304.
17 Session Laws 73rd Congress, Second Session, chapter 512, pp. 955-958.
The act was signed June 14, 1934. It provides; "Sec. 274D (Judicial Code).(1) In cases of actual controversy the courts of the United States shall
have power, upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropriate
pleading to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party
petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be prayed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a finaljudgment or decree and be reviewable as such.
"(2) Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary or proper.' The application shall be by peti-
tion to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be
deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any ad-
verse party, whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaration, to show
cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
"(3) When a declaration of right or the granting of further relief based
thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by a jury,
such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories,
with proper instructions by the court, whether a general verdict be required
or not."
By an amendment of August 30, 1935 the relief was denied as to Federal
taxes. The act as amended by sec. 405 of the Revenue Act of 1935 now
reads, "(1) In cases of actual controversy (except with respect to Federal
Taxes) the courts, etc." It was also provided that the limitation was to be
imposed on all suits then pending as well as to future suits.is A conclusive discussion of the separate provisions of the Uniform Act
is contained in an article by Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss1/7
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
A. No Executory Award
In the absence of statutes permitting declaratory judgments
the courts will not render declaratory decrees.19 What then is
the chief characteristic of the declaratory judgment that has
prompted the courts to refuse such relief? The important feature
is that it orders nothing to be done, but stops with the "declara-
tion." While the courts have seized upon this unique (so some
courts have said) feature as a basis for denying this type of
relief, one of the most eminent authorities on procedure 20 has ex-
pressed the belief that this fact alone does not justify the courts
in regarding the declaratory judgment as an extra-ordinary
remedy. The first specific expression that the "award of execu-
tion is an essential part of every judgment passed by a court,
exercising judicial power" was in the case of Gordon v. UnitedStates.21 The fallacy of this contention was apparently recog-
nized by the court in 1927 in Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v.
Swope22 where it was held that the award of execution was not
an essential adjunct of the judicial power. This view has twice
been reiterated by the Supreme Court.23 Whereas, it is to be
admitted that the command of the court is an incident to the
effectiveness of a judgment, it is the determination of the legal
rights that renders the matter res judicata. An analysis of the
function of a judgment, whether in rem or in personam, reveals
that very often its purpose is merely to determine, declare, and
establish the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship.2'
The conclusion that the primary function of a judgment is not
for the redress of a wrong, but often to declare, preserve and
protect a right is further fortified by the statutory language
(1934) 1. c. 74-91. For the discussion of the provisions of the Federal Act
see Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 21 Va. L. R. 35, 1. c.,
43-48.
19 United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (1927) 18 F (2d) 299; Nelson
v. Burns (1930) 255 Ill. App. 314; State ex rel. Patton v. Terpstra (1928)
206 Iowa 418, 220 N. W. 357; White v. Franklin (1932) 165 Miss. 729, 140
So. 876; Ex parte Steele (1908) 162 Fed. 694; Snell v. Welch (1903) 28
Mont. 482, 72 Pac. 988; Hanson v. Griswold (1915) 221 Mass. 228, 108 N. E.
1035; 33 C. J. 1097, sec. 57, and cases cited.
20 Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 234 sec. 53.
21 (1865) 117 U. S. 697. Prior reference to this point was made in
Hayburn's Case (1792) 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Ferreira (1851) 13
How. 40.22 (1927) 274 U. S. 123.
28 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioners (1929) 279 U. S. 716; Nash-
ville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Wallace, infra note 81.
24 Phillips, Code Pleading (2nd ed. 1932) chap. 11; Pomeroy, Code
Remedies (4th ed. 1904) sec. 347. See also Sheldon v. Powell (1930) 99
Fla. 782, 128 So. 258. This fact is perhaps most evident in annulment
decrees.
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employed in the acts which abolish the distinction between legal
and equitable actions. The usual phrasing used is, 'There shall
be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or
protection of private rights .... "2
Historically the courts were established for the purpose of
peaceably redressing wrongs in lieu of the then prevalent remedy
of self help. Courts of equity have, however, for centuries recog-
nized the practical inadequacy of purely remedial relief and,
under the guise of some legal caption, have rendered many de-
crees which are essentially declaratory in nature. Bills for the
cancellation of instruments and reformation of contracts, suits
to quiet title and to remove clouds, decrees of annulment, bills
quia timet and interpleader, and bills for the perpetuation of
testimony are notable examples of suits which are primarily
concerned with preventing future injury rather than compensa-
tion for a past wrong.26 The extension of these well lmown
equity principles into the declaratory judgment field will permit
adjudication heretofore impossible. For example, it is easy to
imagine a situation where one's right is not actually invaded,
but merely placed in jeopardy, or at least in doubt, by some un-
foreseen event.27 The only thing evident is that the plaintiff is
troubled because of the uncertainty of his legal relation. The
courts by removing the uncertainty, will at the same time con-
firm or deny one's existing rights. By so acting the courts are
performing their most useful purpose; for by it they are estab-
lishing a security in jural relations which is the Gibraltar of
social progress and economic stability. In so far as the declara-
tory action will serve to remove the cloud from legal relations, it
is merely an extension, and a worthy one, of the bill quia timet,
viz., although no wrong has been committed which would form a
legal action and none so immediately threatened as to afford a
basis for injunctive relief against its commission yet the mere ex-
istence of the controversy has immediate harmful consequences. 28
It is elementary that such a procedure will permit the bringing of
25 R. S. Mo. 1929 sec. 696.26 Bills quia timet-a writ of prevention designed to avoid possible future
injury to one's property. In this same nature are bills for the cancellation
of instruments and injunctions to prevent waste.
Bills of peace-a bill designed to establish and to perpetuate a right which
may be controverted by many persons.
Actions to perpetuate testimony-designed to preserve for future use
testimony which is in danger of being lost. In England it has been judicially
declared that such a bill is unnecessary where an action for a declaratoryjudgment would suffice to declare the litigant's respective rights. West v.
Lord Sackville (1903) 2 Ch. 378.27 For a collection of cases on this point see Borchard, Declaratory Judg-
ments, 1. c. 25.
28 State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove (1921) 109 Kans. 619, 201 Pac. 82.
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legal issues before courts forjudicial determination before hostile
action has caused excessive-and ofttimes irreparable-injury.
Its "nip in the bud" characteristic will prevent neighbors from
becoming bitter enemies and will enable business associates to
remain friends.
Whereas the declaratory decree does not require that conse-
quential relief be awarded, the judgment may be made the basis
for such relief, if necessary, in a subsequent action. In this re-
spect, it differs in no way from those equitable proceedings where
the enforcement of the orders is obtained only on a subsequent
order in contempt or otherwise. The rule that all courts have
inherent power to enforce their decress, and to make such orders
as may be necessary to render them effective29 is not at all
abridged because the judgment happens to be declaratory in
nature. The declaratory judgment is not an imposition upon
the courts of a new device: it is merely the extension of the well
established judicial function of declaring the law which governs
a given condition of facts so as to make the factual controversy
res judicataY' It is an innovation only in so far as it relieves
litigants of the requirement that there be an actual violation of
a right before the courts be called upon to adjudicate the differ-
ences.3 1
B. Only Applicable to Actual Controversies
One fond contention of the opponents of this newly enacted
procedure is that it requires the court to give advisory opinions
and adjudicate "moot" cases. The claim is unfounded. No de-
cision can be found in which a court decided a "moot" case under
a declaratory judgment statute. The distinction between a moot
case, and advisory opinion, on the one hand, and a declaratory
judgment on the other hand is well recognized in the case law.32
The expression "advisory opinion" dates back to the early periods
of English history and connotes the practice of extra-judicial
consultation of the Judges by the Crown and the House of
Lords.33 It is but an expression of opinion on facts not neces-
sarily in dispute, and is generally an ex parte proceeding which
has no binding effect on future litigation. A "moot" case is
29 34 C. J. 737.
30 Petition of Kariher (1925) 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265.
31 De Charette v. St. Matthews Bank & Trust Co. (1926) 214 Ky. 400,
283 S. W. 410; American Nat'l. Bank and Trust Co. v. Kushner (1934)
174 S. E. 777.
.12See dissenting opinion by Sharpe, J., in Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry.
(1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350. See also Adams v. R. R. (1899)
21 R. I. 134, 43 Atl. 515; Miller v. Miller (1924) 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W.
965; Douglas Oil Co. v. State (1935 Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. (2d) 1064;
Petition of Kariher, supra.
33 Douglas Oil Co. v. State (1935 Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. (2d) 1064.
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imaginary and the decision is mere dictum. The declaratoryjudgment, on the other hand, differs toto coelo from either of
the two. The declaratory judgment deals only with a real factual
issue, and the decision is res judicata. This makes it clear that
the rule against the advisory opinions and "moot" cases does
not justify its being moulded into a barrier against declaratory
proceedings, 34 which applies only to "actual controversies."
The "actual controversy" requirement has an interesting his-
tory. After the Michigan court declared the declaratory judg-
ment act of that state invalid,3" on the basis that no actual con-
troversy was presented the state of Kansas, in an effort to guard
against the misapplication of the function of the declaratoryjudgment, expressly provided as a prerequisite to the institution
of the proceeding that an "actual controversy" exist.8 1 The in-
clusion of this provision will in no way increase the utility of the
act, but will afford a basis to those jurists who are hostile to the
proceedings, to say that a controversy concerning, legal rights
arising before damage is inflicted, or at least seriously threat-
ened, is not "actual" and thereby justify their refusal to adjudi-
cate the issue.3 It follows from the very nature of the act that
as a prerequisite to the action a bona fide controversy between
parties must exist. The cases are legion in the expression of this
requirement even in the absence of the expressed "actual con-
troversy" provision 81 Courts differ as the day is long as to what
constitutes a controversy, but none deny its necessity as a con-
dition precedent to the maintenance of the action. In Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis39 the fact that the statute at issue was
not being forcibly imposed upon the petitioner was considered
controlling in the determination that no controversy over which
34 Ellingswood, Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 28 I1. L. R.
74, 1. c., 88.35 Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co. (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350.
36 The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act contains a similar provision.
So does the acts of California, Kentucky, Virginia, and Hawaii.
37 Supra, note 18, at page 35.
38 Holt v. Custer County (1926) 75 Mont. 328, 243 Pac. 811; Petition of
Kariher, supra; Revis v. Daugherty (1926) 215 Ky. 823, 287 S. W. 28;
Tanner v. Boyton Lumber Co. (1925) 98 N. J. Eq. 85, 129 Atl. 617; Miller
v. Miller (1923) 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965; Garden City News v. Hurst(1929) 129 Kan. 365, 282 Pac. 720; Hagan v. Dungannon Lumber Co. (1926)
145 Va. 568, 134 S. E. 570; Dietz v. Zimmer (1929) 231 Ky. 546, 21 S. W.(2d) 999; Cummings v. Shipp (1928) 156 Tenn. 595, 3 S. W. (2d) 1062;
Insurance Co. v. Cochrane, infra, Dobson v. Ocean Acci. & G. Corp. (1933)
124 Neb. 652, 247 N. W. 789; Shepard v. Hauser (1935) 138 Cal. App. 384,
32 P (2d) 149; Board of Education v. Borgen (1935) 192 Minn. 512, 257
N. W. 92. A mere difference of opinion is not an actual controversy.
Jefferson County ex rel. Coleman v. Chilton (1930) 236 Ky. 614, 33 S. NY.
(2d) 601.
39 (1927) 273 U. S. 70.
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the court could take jurisdiction was established, yet in another
case'" the court was of the opinion that the mere existence of a
statute, whether or not an attempt was made to enforce it against
the plaintiff, constitutes an invasion of his rights, justifying a
resort to the court for a declaration. Actions by taxpayers
against tax collectors to have declared the 'validty of a taxing
statute have been held to establish a justiciable controversy.41
The more desirable rule has recently been expressed in the case
of Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler 42 where the court declared that any
person who would be subject to regulation by an act might apply
for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the regu-
lation. In other words, the courts will, it appears, no longer
search behind the pleadings to ascertain whether there is an
"actual" controversy. In one of the first federal cases to be
adjudicated under Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 3 it was
held that there was an "actual controversy" in that the defendant
by contesting the suit, indicated that he intended to take issue
with the claims of the plaintiff.
It is difficult to find a common denominator that will bring the
decisions into harmony. Mr. Justice Hall, in Miller v. Miller"
attempted to lay down a standard when he said:
". .. The only controversy necessary to invoke the action
of the court and have it to declare rights under our declara-
tory judgment statute is that the question must be real, and
not theoretical; the person raising it must have a real in-
terest and there must be someone having a real interest to
oppose the declaration sought. It is not necessary that any
breach should be first committed, any right invaded, or
wrong done . . ."
Perhaps it would be desirable to drop the requirement of an
"actual controversy" and permit the plaintiff to force a con-
troversy, as has been recommended. 45 It seems immaterial for
the line of demarcation between cases of actual theoretical con-
troversies cannot be controlled effectively by express provisions.
Rather, the determination will depend solely upon the function
of judicial inclusion and exclusion. 46 One limitation, however,
40 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 365; City v.
Milliken (1925) 257 Ky. 245, 77 S. W. (2d) 777.41 Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith (1934) 127 Neb. 424, 255 N. W.
551; State ex rel. Tele. Co. v. Henry (1935) - Wis. - , 260 N. W. 486.
42 (1935) - Conn. -, 179 Ati. 195.
4' Black v. Little (1934) 8 F. Supp. 867.
44 (1923) 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965.
4' Schroth, The Actual Controversy In Declaratory Actions. 20 Cornell
L. Q. 1.
4 Supra, note 34.
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can be stated with a good deal of positiveness. The courts are
almost unanimous in holding that they will not render declara-
tory relief on facts that have not accrued. It is not considered
sufficient that the danger is contingent on the occurrence of some
future event or events.47 To illustrate: the courts have refused
to determine who will be entitled to a fund prior to the time for
its distribution,48 it has refused to declare who will have the
burden of proof in the event an action is brought, and whether
it will be barred by the Statute of Limitations ;49 and it has like-
wise declined to adjudicate the validity of a city ordinance which
was merely being considered by the city assembly. ° The reason
underlying the hesitancy of the courts in adjudicating issues
dependent upon future contingencies appears to be that the courts
are unable accurately to anticipate the facts that will become
operative to effect other and different persons.
C. Miseellaneous Requirements
The statement is generally made that declaratory relief is
discretionary.52 This statement has often proved misleading. The
extent of the discretion is rather that which is permitted within
the wording of the act. The restriction imposed by section 6
states:
"The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratoryjudgment or decree where such judgment or decree if ren-
dered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or con-
troversy giving rise to the proceeding."
47 Hodges v. Hamblin Co. (1925) 152 Tenn. 395, 277 S. W. 901; In re
Gooding (1925) 208 N. Y. Supp. 793; Reese v. Adamson (1929) 297 Pa. 13,
146 AtI. 262; Van Roy v. Hoover (1928) 96 Fla. 194, 117 So. 887; Black v.
Coal Corp. (1930) 233 Ky. 588, 26 S. W. (2d) 481; Villani v. National City
Bank (1932) 256 N. Y. Supp. 602; Sigal v. Wise (1932) 114 Conn. 297,
158 AtI. 891; Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. v. City of South Milwaukee (1935)
260 N. W. 631; In re Grotenrath's Estate (1934) 215 Wis. 381, 254 N. W.
631.48 orril v. Roberts (1918) 117 Me. 465, 104 Atl. 818.
49 ldham County v. Arvin (1932) 244 Ky. 551, 51 S. W. (2d) 657. In
fact declaratory actions cannot be invoked for the determination of pro-
cedural rules or declaration of substantive rights involved in a pending
suit. Lumber Co. v. Knuckles (1934) 253 Ky. 292, 69 S. W. (2d) 345.
For a discussion of circumstances where it is necessary to determine rights
which will arise in the future see comment 20 St. L. L. R. 278.
&0 Denver v. Denver Land Co. (1929) 85 Colo. 198, 274 Pac. 743.
51 Columbia University v. New York (1929) 235 N. Y. Supp. 4, Bareham
v. Rochester (1927) 246 N. Y. 140, 158 N. E. 51; Transport Oil Co. v.
Bush (1931) 114 Cal. App. 152, 1 P (2d) 1060; A. Hamburger & Sons v.
Rice (1933) 18 P (2d) 115; Kallikau v. Hall (1923) 27 Hawaii 420; James
v. Alderton (1931) 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401; Colson v. Pilgram (1932)
259 N. Y. 370, 182 N. E. 19; Ackerman v. Union (1917) 91 Conn. 500, 100
Atl. 22; Amer. B. & T. Co. v. Kushner (1934 Va.) 174 S. E. 777. Bell
Telephone Co. v. Lewis (1934) 313 Pa. 374, 169 Atl. 571; Automotive
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss1/7
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The criterion then, is whether or not a useful purpose will be
served by rendering the declaration. 2 Although the criterion of
"useful purpose" is too general to afford a definite guide in prac-
tice it has moulded itself into a standard. That courts should
not be too astute to refuse the declaratory remedy is further
evidenced by the provisions of section 12 of the Uniform Act
which recites that the act is to be liberally construed and admin-
istered. This section of the act has received express judicial ap-
proval.5 3 So while the courts will continue to reiterate the rule
that the relief is discretionary, where the requirements are pres-
ent it is both the right and the duty of the court to take jurisdic-
tion and render declaratory relief.54
As a general rule declaratory relief has been denied in in-
stances where all the parties in interest were not made parties
to the suit.5 5 In so far as the basis for this holding is that to
declare the rights of some persons would not accomplish the de-
sired purpose because the parties whose rights were not declared
would not be bound by the decision there is no reason to quarrel
with the rule. Courts have, however, often overlooked the reason
for the rule and have acted arbitrarily in dismissing actions were
all the parties interested were not joined, though the rights of
the non-joined parties were immaterial and problematic. Nor
is the rule as it is often judically applied, justified by the word-
Equipment v. Trico Products (1935) 11 F. Supp. 292; Baumert Dairy
Products v. Borden Co. (1935) 281 N. Y. Supp. 423.
52 Somberg v. Somberg (1933) 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E. 137; Taylor v.
Haverford Twp. (1930) 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639. But a court must not
act arbitrarily, and when relief is refused reasons for the refusal must be
made part of the court record and may be made the basis for an appeal.
Northwestern Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. v. Freedy (1930) 201 Wis. 51, 227 N. W.
952; Colson v. Pilgrim (1932) 259 N. Y. 370, 182 N. E. 19.
33 Carolina P. & L. Co. v. Iseley (1933) 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56.5 4 Wingate v. Flynn (1931) 249 N. Y. Supp. 351. It is noteworthy that
courts have expressed the view that declaratory decrees will not be rendered
on cases presented on an agreed set of facts. Williams v. Powell (1894)
W. N. 141. But there appears to be no U. S. case on this problem.
55 Continental Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cochrane (1931) 89 Colo. 462, 4 P. (2d)
308. Here the Insurance Co. sued the Insurance commissioner of Colorado
seeking to obtain the declaratory judgment determining an alleged con-
troversy between the said parties arising out of conflicting interpretations
put upon certain provisions of the company's charter membership policies.
The court refused to declare the rights because the policyholders of these
charter policies were not made parties, although their interests would be
vitally affected by the decree. In Hall v. U. S. Nat'l. Bank of Omaha (1935)
128 Neb. 254, 258 N. W. 403, it was held that the state treasurer could not
maintain declaratory judgment actions against state depository banks,
which refused to honor checks drawn by him, because of doubt existing as
to his official status, to determine his status under his bond, since the state
and the surety on the bond were not joined. See also Updike Inv. Co. v.
Assurance Co. (1935) 128 Neb. 295, 258 N. W. 470; Wright v. McGee
(1934) 206 N. C. 52, 173 S. E. 31.
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ing of the act. Section 11 of the Uniform Act which recites
the necessity of joining all persons who have an interest in
the issue, does not render it mandatory that every interested
person be made a party, for the section further provides that if
certain persons are not made parties, the court may still issue
the decree, which will not prejudice the rights of persons not
parties.
Historically, where there was an adequate reinedy at law an
action in equity was dismissed. That problem is now present in
this analogous procedure. The problem in equity was dispensed
with in a liberal manner. The present rule is to the effect that
it is not enough to dismiss the action, that there is a remedy at
law; it must be plain and adequate; as practical and efficient to
the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the equitable
remedy.56 Such a solution would be desirable under this new
procedure. The bare fact that there is another remedy available
should not be made the basis for the refusal of the declaratory
relief, per se. Admittedly, this contention has received little
judicial support, with the courts generally holding that where
another remedy is provided- by statute, the court will refuse
declaratory relief.57 Often a distinction is made when the other
remedy is statutory or one at common law. The cases so holding
take the view that when the other remedy is a common law
remedy declaratory relief may be decreed, whereas, when the
other remedy is statutory then declaratory relief is precluded.,8
The contention that where there is a specific statutory remedy
for a case provided, a declaratory judgment will not be rendered
is really a contradiction of that portion of the Act that says,
"whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." There
is no historical precedent for the supposition that the declaratory
judgment is like an extraordinary remedy and to be employed
only where no other regular action is available for since the
inception of modern declaratory actions it has existed co-ordi-
nately with prayers for coercive relief (which must be pleaded
56 Boyce v. Grundy (1830) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 210.
57 Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis (1934) 313 Pa. 374, 169 Atl. 571; Reynolds
v. Chase (1935 N. H.) 177 Atl. 291; Petition of Kariher, supra; Shearer v.
Backer (1925) 207 Ky. 455, 269 S. W. 543; Baird v. Wyandotte County(1924) 117 Kan. 151, 230 Pac. 531; Kaleilau v. Hall (1923) 27 Hawaii 420;
Jefferson ex rel. Coleman v. Chilton, supra; Shores v. Ayres (1931) 254
Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829; Slowmach Realty Corp. v. Leopold (1932) 258
N. Y. Supp. 500; McCalmont v. McCalmont (1928) 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 203.
In many of the cases the ruling was unfortunate dicta, since all that was
necessary to be said to decide the issue was that the court did not have juris-
diction over the subject matter originally, and that the declaratory judg-
ment acts do not extend its powers over matters which are beyond itsjudicial power.58 Hoel v. Kansas City (1930) 131 Kan. 290, 291 Pac. 780.
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in a separate count) .5 In fact, declaratory judgments may be
had where coercive relief is also sought, where such relief could
be had but was not asked for because the plaintiff was satisfied
with a milder remedy, and where, because no damage had yet
been inflicted or dangerously threatened, coercive relief could not
be obtained.60
CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. In The State Courts
In no foreign country has the Declaratory Judgment Act been
challenged on a constitutional basis. In this country the attack
has been predicted upon the political theory of the separation of
powers, and the issue is dependent on a determination of what
is judical power. Do declaratory actions fall within the "case
and controversy" requirement?
The first state case to adjudicate the constitutionality of the
Declaratory Judgment Act was the case of Anway v. Grand
Rapids Ry. Co.18 A Michigan statute prohibited railway em-
ployees from working more than six days a week. The plaintiff,
a non-union conductor, wishing, so he alleged, to work more
than the six days, brought a suit under the state Declaratory
Judgment statute, in which his employer was made a defendant,
asking that the court declare that he could work more than the
limited number of days prescribed by the statute. The railway
employees' union intervened and contended that the statute should
be construed as preventing the plaintiff from working more than
six days. The employer-defendant answered; not claiming, how-
ever, that any right was invaded or threatened of invasion. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the verdict for the plaintiff and
dismissing the action, held that no controversy existed, and then
went on to state that the Declaratory Judgment Statute was un-
constitutional. The majority of the court gave as their reason
for this holding that the statute imposed "non-judicial" functions
on the court, because the power to make a binding declaration
of rights where no consequential relief can be had is not a judicial
power, and cannot be conferred on the courts. It is quite evident
from a close examination of the majority opinion, that they con-
fused the declaratory judgment with advisory opinions and moot
cases: for throughout the opinion cases which are truly moot and
advisory are cited as authoritative.62 The writer has been un-
59 Brix v. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1934) - Calif. -, 37 P (2d)
448; Lowe v. Lowe (1934) 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291; Gold v. Gold,
(1934) 275 N. Y. Supp. 507.
60 Supra, note 59.
61 (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350, 12 A. L. R. 26.
61 The dissenting opinion by Sharpe, J., was precise in pointing out the
misconception of the majority opinion on this matter.
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able to find any comments praising the decision. Some of the
commentators feel that the court was essentially right in holding
that there was no "actual controversy," since the adverse party
to the issue was not the employer-defendant but the employees'
union who intervened and who were outside the jurisdiction of
the court.6 3 Others take the view that the court had no just
reason to search behind the pleading and examine the situation.
It does seem that the defendant in the instant case had as much
of an adverse interest as do corporations in a suit by a stock-
holder brought to enjoin them from paying a tax imposed.
As to the theory of the Michigan court that an occasion to
issue final process is a prerequisite to the exercise of the judicial
power, the court was surely in error.6 5 And regardless of
whether the court took jurisdiction over a case which the Act
did not intend it to, the effect of the decision was damaging, in
that it placed a temporary impediment in the path of declaratory
actions.
In the next important state decision we find a Kansas court
more enterprising. The case of State ex rel Hopkins v. Grove"3
was one brought to have declared the rights of an elected officer
under a certain statute. The Kansas act contained the express
requirement of an "actual controversy." 67 This provision the
court held enabled them to distinguish this case from the Anwcy
case, which, however, was disapproved, while the dissenting opin-
ion of Sharpe, J., was accepted. The Grove case having decided
that the declaratory judgment procedure, besides being an ex-
pedient method of obtaining an adjudication without requiring
damage as a condition precedent, was not repugnant to thejudicial power as confined by the Constitution, became the ac-
cepted guide by other jurisdictions which were called upon to
adjudicate upon the validity of the Declaratory Judgment Stat-
utes.
In 1924 the Tennessee court in Miller v. Miller68 announced a
decision in which the Uniform Act was declared constitutional.
In declaring the plaintiff's rights under the disputed will the
court stated that it was of the opinion that it was within the
province of the judiciary to adjudicate upon, and protect, rights
of citizens and to apply the laws in pursuance therewith. No
63 See comments in 4 Ill. L. Q. 126; 30 Yale L. J. 161; 5 Minn. L. R. 172,
21 Col. L. R. 168.
64 See comment in 19 Mich. L.R. 86; 7 Cornell L. Q. 255.
65 See discussion by note 21, supra. Also see Gray, Nature and Sources of
the Law, (2d ed. 1921) 115; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903)
132; 30 Yale L. J. 163, 164.
66 (1921) 109 Kans. 619, 201 Pac. 82.
67 See discussion by note 36.
6 8 Miller v. Miller (1924) 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965.
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jurisdiction has declared the Uniform Act invalid. In some states
the courts have not been called upon to decide the issue as yet:
in all those where the issue has been presented for judicial deter-
mination it has been declared constitutional. It is most notable
that ten years after the Anway case the Michigan court reversed
itself in the case of Washington Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore,70
where the constitutionality of the act was upheld.
B. U. S. Supreme Court Cases Before the Federal Act
Since the "case and controversy" provision of Article III of
the Federal Constitution has been judicially interpreted in Mar-
bury v. Madison'1 it has remained substantially unchanged. The
courts are firm in their holding that Congress cannot confer
upon them jurisdiction over any causes which are not "cases or
controversies."
It is often claimed that the Supreme Court's hostility to what
we now term declaratory judgments is found in the case of
Muskrat v. United States.72 The suit was brought by the Chero-
kee Indians as authorized by an act of Congress. The act was
later repealed and the petitioners contended that the repeal was
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court took the position that it
was without jurisdiction over the cause and remanded the case
to the Court of Claims with instructions to dismiss the case. Al-
though the court did say that there was no "case" presented
since the purpose of the action was to determine the doubtful
character of the legislation, a careful analysis of the decision
will reveal that it is not a precedent for the holding that the
courts will not entertain declaratory actions, for in fact, the
interests of the government-defendant would in no way be af-
fected by the decision, whatsoever it might have been. But the
case was considered to have laid down that very proposition, and
was relied on by the Michigan court in the Anway case. It is
the implication and not the actual holding, that is to be regretted.
The next important Supreme Court decision on the topic was
that rendered in the case of Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis.73
69 Some of the more important decisions are: Arizona: Morton v. Pacific
Construction Co. (1929) 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281; California: Blakeslee v.
Wilson (1923) 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495; Connecticut: Braman v. Babcock
(1923) 98 Conn. 549, 120 Ati. 150; Florida: Sheldon v. Powell (1930) 99
Fla. 782, 128 So. 258; Kansas: State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, supra;
Michigan: Washington Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore (1930) 249 Mich. 673,
229 N. W. 618; New York: Board of Education v. Van Zandt (1923) 234
N. Y. 644, 138 N. E. 481; Pennsylvania: Petition of Kariher (1925) supra;
Tennessee: Miller v. Miller, supra. For a complete list of cases see Borch-
ard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 635 et seq.
7O (1930) 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618, 68 A. L. R. 105.
71 (1803) 1 Cranch 137.
72 (1911) 219 U. S. 346. Opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Day.
73 (1927) 273 U. S. 70.
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The case originally was brought under the Kentucky Declaratory
Judgment Act and sought the determination of the validity of a
statute which proported to regulate the sale of tobacco at public
auction. The verdict for the defendant was appealed to the Su-
preme Court, which refused to review the merits of the decision
on the basis that no "case or Controversy" was presented over
which the court could properly take jurisdiction. The court felt
justified in so declaring since there was no allegations that the
plaintiff intended to violate the act, or that the defendant had
threatened to prosecute them for violation. This decision was
closely followed by the case of Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Ass'n74 Here the court in refusing to review
the decision for the defendant, declared that they had no juris-
diction to review mere declaratory judgments. The decisions
seem to indicate that injury must be a condition precedent to
a resort to the judicial power. A search of the law reviews show
that the Liberty Warehouse Co. cases were accepted as deserving
of great stricture.75
In the same year another important decision was rendered in
the case of Willing v. Chicago Auditorium."0 The corporation
was desirous of rebuilding the premises maintained upon the
grounds of the lessor, and being skeptical as to their right to do
so, because of the lease, brought suit to remove the cloud formed
by the provisions in question. It is of importance to note that
the petitioners did not ask for declaratory relief, but only that
the cloud be removed. On appeal to the Supreme Court the opin-
ion of the court was rendered by Mr. Justice Brandeis. The
court admitted that the case was not a "moot" one; that.a final
judgment could be given; that the interests of the parties were
definite and certain; that there was no attempt to secure an
abstract determination by the court of the validity of the stat-
ute ;77 but the court felt that no "case" within the meaning of
Article III was presented since the plaintiffs fears were thwarted
by his own doubts. All that it was necessary to say to decide
the case was that there was no cloud which could be removed.
But Mr. Justice Brandeis preferred another approach. He said
in substance, that all that the plaintiff wanted was a declaratory
judgment, and that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the court
to review a mere declaratory decree. The court was content to
say that such a friendly proceeding was unknown at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. Once again, it was not the
74 (1928) 276 U. S. 71.
'1 See 100 Cent. L. J. 95; 40 Harvard L. R. 903; 25 Mich. L. R. 529;
36 Yale L. R. 845.
76 (1928) 277 U. S. 274.
7 1. c., p. 289.
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actual decision that "hurt" but the syllogistic generalization that
it uttered. The decision seems to reason as follows: the suit is
a friendly suit over which the courts have no jurisdiction; it is
a suit for a declaratory judgment; therefore, all declaratory judg-
ment suits involve a friendly suit. The only encouragement given
by the Willing case to the proponents of the act is the dictum
uttered by Mr. Justice Stone in a concurring opinion. He says,
"I am not prepared ... to say anything in support of the view
that Congress may not constitutionally confer on the federal
courts jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments...."
Within a comparatively short time the court again took occa-
sion to denounce declaratory relief as being beyond the limits
of the judicial power, but no specific discussion of its uncon-
stitutionality was engaged in either Piedmont & Northern Ry.
Co. v. United States8 or in Arizona v. California."
It is evident from a perusal of the five decisions that the chief
obstacle to the validity of such judgments centered in the belief
that they did not fit the legal concept of justiciable controver-
sies.80
In 1933 the Supreme Court seems to have completely reversed
its previous holdings. Mr. Justice Stone rendered the opinion
in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,8' a case
brought by the railroad under the Declaratory Judgment Act of
Tennessee to secure a judicial declaration that a state statute
imposing a tax on the storage of gasoline was, as to them, in-
valid. A verdict for defendant was appealed to the Supreme
Court, and in an unanimous decision the decision for defendant
was affirmed, but at the same time it was stated that the Supreme
Court would review actions brought under the declaratory pro-
cedure. In view of the past cases the pronouncement of the court
was extraordinary. The court held that if a question presented
was justiciable if presented in a suit for injunction, it was no
less so because the appellants were permitted to present the case
through a modified procedure under which they were not re-
quired to make a prayer for an executory award, or to allege
irreparable damages. Another passage in the decision that com-
mands our attention, is that which says, "While the ordinary
course of judicial procedure results in a judgment requiring an
award of process or execution to carry it into effect, such relief
is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the judicial
function." (Italics own.) 8 2
78 (1930) 280 U. S. 469.
TO (1931) 283 U. S. 423.
80 Comment by "S. M. R." in 18 St. Louis L. R. 261 (1933).
81 (1933) 288 U. S. 249, 77 L. Ed. 730, 87 A. L. R. 1191.
82 See discussion by note 23, supra.
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While the Wallace case decides that the Supreme Court will
not refuse to entertain jurisdiction over causes instituted under
state declaratory judgment acts, query, whether it is a clue to the
validity of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Since the
case preceded the enactment of the Federal statute it contains
no reference to the act, therefore, we must search various pas-
sages for clues and speculate upon the final outcome.
The court's attitude to this newer procedure seems to be ex-
pressed in the following passage:
"The judiciary clause of the Constitution defined and
limited judicial power, not the particular method by which
that power might be envoked. It did not crystallize into
changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only possible
means for presenting a case or controversy otherwise cog-
nizable by the federal courts."
It is not to be overlooked that the Wallace case did not ex-
pressly overrule the previous cases, rather it distinguished them
from the instant case. In so far as the court entered upon these
distinctions there is some justification for the belief that the
Wallace case merely decided that jurisdiction would be main-
tained over the particular case, and that it did not announce a
principle of law by which they will be guided in the future. On
the other hand there is basis for the belief that the decision is
more far reaching. The language used in the decision leads to
the conclusion that the Court has made an "about face" on the
question of reviewing declaratory judgments. If this is so would
it nbt be incongruous for the Supreme Court to take appellate
jurisdiction over causes arising under Declaratory Judgment
Statutes in the states, and to shut the door to original petitions
based on the same procedure? Up to the time of this writing
the Court has not had occasion to express its view as to the con-
stitutionality of the Federal Act. Only once has it had occasion
to mention-but not adjudicate upon-the act.83
The Wallace case is the first case in which the nature of the
declaratory judgment was fully investigated. In that case no
other relief was possible, and the conclusion reached is a definite
precedent. In the prior cases the court went out of its way to
denounce the declaratory actions (since in each case the same
result would have been arrived at without any reference to the
nature of the proceeding). It was this very fact that led legal
83 United States v. West Virginia (1935) Sup. Ct. 789. Here the govern-
ment made no attempt to sustain the bill in equity under the Declaratory
Judgment Act but the court made mention of the fact that even if it had it
would have made no difference since no justiciable controversy was present
and the act does not purport to alter the character of the controversies
which are the subject of judicial power under the Constitution.
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scholars to the conclusion that the court's caustic attitude could
never be neutralized. Yet the court has now said that "changes
merely in form or method of procedure by which federal rights
are brought to final adjudication in the state courts are not
enough to preclude review by this court." The Wallace case
decision has laid the foundation for a more serviceable juris-
prudence. To declare the Federal Act unconstitutional the Court
would have to shut its eyes to the overwhelming weight of opin-
ion of the state courts; to the recognition that the procedure has
benefited the populace of foreign countries; to a procedure that
discourages violence. It is unthinkable that the Supreme Court
is prepared to construct an impassable barrier to the progress
of preventive justice.
CASES UNDER THE FEDERAL ACT
Up to the time of writing there has been no case adjudicating
upon the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in any federal court
other than the District Courts. Whereas none of the District
Courts have seen fit to declare the act unconstitutional, and none
have even seen fit to discuss this angle, it is considered important
to review the manner in which this new procedure has been
handled to see whether or not the federal courts will allow the
declaratory actions to fulfill the fond hopes of its fervent advo-
cates.
The first case to be brought under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act was that of Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Gully.84
The suit was brought by a foreign corporation, claiming tax
exemption under the state constitution, and seeking relief from
financial peril of tax exactions by the collectors allegedly acting
illegally. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and it was
overruled. The plaintiff was held to be entitled to declaratory
relief under the new Act and the court held, further, that the
mere prayer for declaratory relief was sufficient to necessitate
the overruling the motion to dismiss.
The next case, in point of time was that of Hary v. United
Electric Coal Co."" This was a suit brought by the employees
of the defendant company to have declared their rights to bar-
gain collectively under the privileges conferred by the N. I. R. A.
The district court held that it was without jurisdiction to deter-
mine the rights conferred by the N. I. R. A. in a private suit.
There is no ground on which to criticize this holding for the
Declaratory Judgment Act was never intended to increase the
jurisdiction of courts to subjects and matter which before the
adoption of the Act did not come properly within their jurisdic-
84 (1934) 8 F. Supp. 169.
85 (1934) 8 F. Supp. 655.
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tion. This same holding was the basis for the decisions denying
declaratory decrees in the following cases: Mississippi P. & L.
Co. v. City of Jackson,6 Automotive Equipment Inc. v. Trico
Products Corp.8' and in Lake Erie Provision Co. v. Moore.,8 The
decision in the Hary case did say, however, that where the court
did have jurisdiction over the subject matter and matters ofjusticiability were present, the court would declare the jural
relations even though the controversy had not ripened into a case
requiring affirmative relief.
In Black v. Little, 9 an attempt was made to have declared the
constitutionality of the A. A. A. as applied to the petitioner. The
petitioner admitted that he was not entitled to relief by injunc-
tion, but alleged that since the District Attorney had power to
insitute judicial proceedings to enforce the act there existed an
"actual controversy" within the meaning of the Act. This con-
tention was sustained by the court, which held that the very fact
that the defendant contested the suit showed that a controversy
did exist. This is a typical example where the court refuses to
look behind the pleadings to decide whether there is a contro-
versy existing.90
The decision in Boggus Motor Co. v. Onderdonk9' can be en-
couraging only to the opponents of the new procedure. In that
case the plaintiff, an auto dealer, was accused of violating the
Code of Fair Competition for the Auto Industry, 02 by defendants
who were district agents of the Recovery division. The accusers
were withdrawn from this district by their superior officers and
the plaintiffs had not been molested by the new officers. The
court assumed that this procedure was evidence of the presump-
tion by the superior officers that the plaintiff was not guilty of
any violation that could be redressed in the courts. Whereas, the
controversy as to plaintiff's violations were put to rest, the plain-
tiff insisted that a controversy as to the validity of the act still
prevailed and in an amended petition asked for a declaration of
the validity of the Code under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The court denied this request, holding that since plaintiff was
no longer in danger of being prosecuted there was no case or
controversy. Such a conclusion is a step backward. It is a re-
86 (1935) 9 F. Supp. 564.
87 (1935) 10 F. Supp. 736.
88 (1935) 11 F. Supp. 522.
89 (1934) 8 F. Supp. 867.
90 This practice should be contrasted with the practice of the Michigan
court in the case of Anway v. Ry. (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350. See
discussion by note 64, supra.
91 (1935) 9 F. Supp. 950.
92Made under the authority of the N. I. R. A. 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 701
et seq.
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turn to the reasoning of the Liberty Warehouse case9 3 and a dis-
regard of the holding of the Wallace case.94
The next ease took a more acceptable view of the functions of
a declaratory action.5 This case was brought to restrain the col-
lection of a tax imposed by the Tobacco Control Act and to secure
declarations of unconstitutionality. The defense set up was that
the act does not apply to cases arising under the revenue laws
because there is another remedy available (the amendment of
August 30, 1935 was not yet in force)."8 The court was explicit
in declaring that the availability of another remedy does not pre-
vent the maintenance of a suit for a declaratory judgment and
therefore the court proceeded to declare the Tobacco Control Act
invalid. The case was cited with approval in Vogt & Sons v.
Rothensei, 97 in which it was held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a declaratory decree regarding certain taxing provisions of
the A. A. A. The decision held the taxing provisions unconsti-
tutional.
The policy of declaring Federal taxes unconstitutional under
the declaratory procedure was apparently repugnant to the legis-
lators who were rapidly seeking sources of income to meet the
heavy governmental expenses. At any rate the Revenue Act of
1935, which was passed August 30th, prohibited the rendering
of declaratory decrees by the federal courts on the validity of
federal taxing statutes." The inclusion of this limitation is one
way to take the "teeth" out of the Declaratary Judgment Act
which at the time was only one year in existence. It does not
seem necessary to hold that this new limitation is an expression
of policy by the Congress to the effect that it desires to limit the
scope of declaratory actions, but rather that the limitation was
prompted by a desire to prolong the decisions on the new tax
acts, the revenue to be derived from which is so needed for the
carrying on of the governmental activities.s8a In Henrietta Mills
v. Hoey"9 the amended provision was used as one of the reasons
for the court's refusing to render a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of some of the taxing provisions contained with-
in the A. A. A. It is immaterial that the suit was brought before
the date when the amended limitation was effected, for the
amendment withdraws the declaratory relief as to suits then
98 Supra, note 73.
94 Supra, note 81.
95 Penn v. Glenn (1935) 10 F. Supp. 483.
9" See this provision reported note 17, supra.
91 (1935) 11 F. Supp. 225.
8 Act of Aug. 30, 1935, c. 829 sec. 405.
98, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 154. Adopted March 2, 1867. Now 26 U. S. C. A.
see. 1543.
99 (1935) 12 F. Supp. 61.
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pending as well as suits in the future.10° The declaratory remedy
being merely a statutory remedy there is no constitutional pro-
hibition against the withdrawal of the relief, even as to suits
already instituted.1°°a
Zenie Bros. v. Miskend 1 was an action by a garment manu-
facturer to obtain an injunction against unfair competition and
to have declared void the defendant's patent on dress seams.
The defendants were threatening plaintiff's customers with in-
fringement suits and were thereby disrupting plaintiff's business.
The court held the action maintainable under the Federal De-
claratory Judgment Act. The case is an example of an action
that but for the declaratory proceeding could not have been main-
tained. IM an ordinary suit a private party, having no patent
himself, cannot instigate a suit to have declared void a com-
petitor's patent. Under the new procedure the court held that
the suit was possible. Says the court, ". . . the act was passed
with the purpose of affording relief in cases that couldn't be tried
under existing forms of procedure. It is a remedial statute and
should be liberally applied." The opinion was expressed that it
does not necessarily follow that the plaintiff's only purpose was
to obtain an advance ruling that they would have a good defense
to an infringement suit, if the defendants would bring such an
action. It is more tenable, the court felt, that the purpose was
to obtain a determination so as to prevent harassment of their
customers and to prevent further interruption with their busi-
ness. This case is undoubtedly a blow to the opponents of de-
claratory actions, while it will provide another case upon which
the proponents can rely to support their movement.
The Automotive Equipment v. Trico Products Corp. case re-
ferred to six paragraphs above was again brought into the
courts ;102 this time in a district where the courts did have juris-
diction over the parties, thus correcting the defect of the first suit,
100 Note 17, supra. The writer desires to call the attention of the reader
to the apparent error in the reporting of this amendment in the Supplement
to the U. S. C. A., title 28, sec. 400, where it is erroneously stated that the
limitation imposed does not apply to suits already pending. By express
provision, the amendment applies to suits pending at that date. See case
cited in note 99.
100kIn Gebelein v. Milbourne (1935) 12 F. Supp. 105, an injunction re-
straining the collecting of the Hog processing tax was granted. The ex-
haustive opinion of Chesnut, J., recites that R. S. see. 3224 (26 U. S. C. A.
see. 154) which provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained," was inapplicable
where there exists highly exceptional circumstances, which in themselves
are sufficient to bring the case within some acknowledged head df equity
jurisprudence. Having granted the injunction on this basis the Declaratory
Judgment Act amendment was held inapplicable.
10: (1935) 10 F. Supp. 779.
102 (1935) 11 F. Supp. 292.
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In effect, the petition ask for a judgment declaring that peti-
tioner's windshield wipers did not infringe upon the patents of
the respondent. The court relied on the Zenie Bros. case in hold-
ing that bedause it was a patent involved was no reason to deny
declaratory relief, but it refused to follow the case any further.
It held directly contra to the Zenie Bros. case in holding that
since there was another remedy available there was no reason to
render a declaratory decree. The conclusion is arguable. The
other remedy which the court refers to is not necessarily as
efficacious: nor does it follow that the court is correct in de-
claring the plaintiff's purpose to be the establishment of a defense
to an action brought by the respondent.s 3 The judicial answer
to the Trico case decision came within two months in the case of
Lionel Corp. v. De Fillippis.04 There too, the case was one in-
volving a patent infringement; there too, there was a case pend-
ing in the trial court; but the court held that the petitioners
could have a declaration as to whether the patents in question
were being infringed on, since, according to this court's opinion,
the issues in the infringement suit were not essentially the same
as those in declaratory action.
The first case to be decided in the District Court of Missouri,
was that of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth et al.105 This
was an action by the insurance company against the insured and
the beneficiary to have declared their liability on a lapsed policy.
The defense filed a motion to dismiss and attacked the Declara-
tory Judgment Act as unconstitutional. In answer the court said,
"The very language of the act destroys the argument.., it was
drawn with the constitutional limitations and the past Supreme
Court decisions in mind .... It is limited to cases of actual con-
troversy. Neither the mere designation of them as 'declaratory'
judgments nor the fact that they embody a new method for the
invocation of the judicial power invalidate them under the Con-
stitution." The decision, however, was for the defendant on the
merits, the court deciding that no present controversy existed,
but merely a potential future controversy. The court refused to
judicially predetermine an issue of fact that will be involved in
a case that may be brought hereafter. As a practical matter, the
plaintiff only desired to protect his defense when the litigation,
if at all, would arise, so he might have accomplished the result
by bringing a bill for the perpetuation of testimony, and thereby
preserving the present testimony which he could use later.
Up to the time of this writing no cases on the Federal Act have
103 The Zenie Bros. v. Miskend case, note 101 supra, held that this purpose
was not to be presumed.
104 (1935) 11 F. Supp. 712.
105 (1935) 11 F. Supp. 1016.
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been adjudicated by any federal court, other than the District
Courts. We must await patiently a decision from the Supreme
Court.
MISSOURI CASES
There are as yet no reported decisions in Missouri on the
validity of the Declaratory Judgment Act of this state. There
is at present a suit filed under the act in the Circuit Court of
St. Louis" which seeks to have the court declare the petitioner's
rights and obligations under the beer ordinance. The case was
originally set for the middle of October but has been continued.
There are but a few early Missouri cases that would, had there
been a statute permitting declaratory actions then, have been
decided under declaratory principles. The first was that of State
ex rel. Hahn v. Westport107 in which a realtor brought a man-
damus proceeding against the city officials, to compel the issuance
of new tax bills in place of old ones previously issued for a public
improvement. The court denounced the proceeding as a sham,
and as an attempt to have the court determine the validity of
the old tax bills. The opinion was climaxed by the statement that
"the legislature and not the judiciary promulgate laws for the
future guidance of the people."
The next case of importance was that of State ex rel. Schackle-
ford v. McElhinnery'08 where the petitioner was a licensed attor-
ney and was duly elected to the office of probate judge in St.
Louis. Subsequent to his election a statute was passed prohibit-
ing a probate judge in counties over 50,000 persons from practic-
ing law, and the act was supported by a penal sanction. The
plaintiff became apprehensive that if he should continue to prac-
tice law he might be prosecuted, so he brought this mandamus
proceeding to cofnpel the respondent, a judge of the St. Louis
Circuit Court, to permit him to practice law, nothwithstanding
the statute which was attacked as invalid. The court in denying
the writ held that it was a mere attempt to get a decision on the
constitutionality of the statute. There is no question but that
under the Declaratory Judgment Act such a factual situation
would be properly adjudicated. In fact the similar circumstances
were adjudicated in State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove.100
In a recent case,110 the court took jurisdiction over a suit for
the re-instatement of a policy which the defendants had forfeited
for non-payment, the court finding "valuable rights claimed by
106 Division No. 3, Judge Baron, presiding judge.
107 (1896) 135 Mo. 120, 36 S. W. 663.
108 (1912) 241 Mo. 592, 145 S. W. 1139.
1Q9 Supra, note 66.
110 Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co. (1932) 330
Mo. 988, 52 S. W. (2d) 1.
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one party and denied by another." The leading United States
Supreme Court Cases of Gordon v. United States'" and Willing
v. Chicago Auditorium1W 2 were distinguished. In the most recent
case1 8 the court recites that the judicial power is confined to
controversies wherein something further than mere declarations
of rights are sought. This view is really no longer tenable, but
in fact, the expression of the court was mere dictum since all that
was necessary to the decision was for the court to say that it no
longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
SUMMARY
The declaratory judgment procedure has been employed in
matters relating to the management and distribution of estates
and trusts; construction and validity of wills, contracts, leases,
insurance policies, bills of sale, mortgages, deeds of trust, and
assignments; construction and validity of statutes and ordi-
nances; to determine title to property; to declare the status of
husband and wife, parent and child; to determine the legitimacy
of a person, or his racial status; to declare the relative rights
between trade associations and member firms; and to declare
the rights of minors or children en ventre sa mere.14
One of the most useful purposes that the declaratory, judg-
ments will serve will be in the field of Administrative Law. This
procedure will permit testing the powers of administrative
agents, thereby preventing unwarranted conduct and resulting
penalties. Administrative officers need only a declaration of
their legal rights in order to be kept within the bounds of their
legality.11 5 This procedure may to some extent supersede the
injunction which has been subjected to great abuse in the process
of the determination of the validity of a law or order. In so far
as it will restrain the use of the injunction it may help to set
aside the hostile feeling now held by the populace against that
form of relief against public laws.1 6
The real value of judgments declaratory of the rights of par-
ties is that the proceeding for such a judgment is an expeditious
and informal method of securing a binding judgment, which will
be res judicata, without either of the parties being obliged to
11 Supra, note 21.
112 Supra, note 76.
113 State v. Witt (1934) 288 Mo. App. 432, 67 S. W. (2d) 817.
114 For a collection of cases see annotations in 12 A. L. R. 76; 19 A. L. R.
1130; 68 A. L. R. 120; 87 A. L. R. 1223. Also Borchard, Judicial Relief for
Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45 Harv. L. R. 793; Borchard, Judicial Relief
for Insecurity (1933) 33 Col. L. R. 648.
215 Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law. 11 N. Y.
L. Q. Rev. 139.
116 See 21 Va. L. Rev. 35, 49.
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assume the responsibility of acting upon his own view of his
rights,-a view which may subsequently be adjudged erroneous,
with the result that he is characterized as a wrongdoer, and
charged with the consequences that are ofttimes disasterous. It
provides a simple, yet conclusive, method of serving the ends of
justice before hostilities have ensued. It is a useful instrument
of "preventive justice" 117 and the extent to which the relief has
come into use under the statutes is sufficient to mark it as a well
recognized instrumentality in the field of contemporary practice.
The declaratory judgment properly administered will fall with-
in the bounds of "judicial power" in so far as it is a suit regu-
larily instigated, and involving adverse parties who present to
the court conflicting claims for adjudication. The steadfast rule
that the scope of the judicial function is to correct rather than to
declare is predicated upon the misconception that everyone knows
what the law is, and further, that it is known just how a court
will construe instruments such as wills, leases, contracts, etc.
Such a restrictive use of the judicial power is in accord only
with custom, and not with reason and logic.118 If the law is to
be a progressive science it must endeavor to fulfill a greater social
need. The declaratory judgment is one method to accomplish
this aim. And there is no constitutional restriction on the power
to recognize the complexity of modern affairs, and to provide for
the settlement of controversies between citizens without requir-
ing violation of rights as a condition precedent to such adjudi-
cation.
The declaratory judgment has effected a revolution from the
time when courts were only the "nemesis of wrongdoers." It
represents the initiation of a procedure which will permit the
courts to serve as a "diplomatic" rather than a "belligerent"
agency.1 9 Cardozo has said120 that law "is the body of rules,
principles, and tendencies which enables one to predict with rea-
sonable certainty the judgments of the courts." The declaratory
procedure will make predictions more easily verifiable . Clients
will no longer have to gamble on the sagacity of counsel.
While the merits of the declaratory actions will be debated pro
and con by the advocates and opponents of the procedure, the
declaratory judgment will continue to serve as an instrument
of preventive justice-inhibitory of injury. The reluctance of
the states to adopt declaratory judgment acts in the '20's has
11Borchard, Declaratory Judgments-A Needed Procedural Reform. 28
Yale L. J. 109 et seq.
118 Bramon v. Babcock (1923) 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150.
'19 Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declara-
tory Judgment, 16 Mich. L. Rev. 69.
120 Cardozo, Growth of the Law, Chap. 2.
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become a spontaneous desire to join the parade of states that
have legislatively recognized its utility. The speedy acceptance
which is now being afforded the declaratory judgment acts is
indicative of its practical efficiency. Thirty-seven Americanjurisdictions have statutes permitting such judgments 2 1 and still
the declaratory judgment marches on.
WALTER FREEDMAN '37.
121 Supra, notes 13 and 14.
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